Why Language Matters: Part V
Narratives, Mythmaking, Ukraine and AI
**Subject to updates after further research**
Ends of History
Putin’s view, and in general the Rus’-centric view, has at its core the idea of historical determinism coupled with historical voluntarism (meaning, there is only one way for history to go; and I will make it happen).
In order for Putin to be able to “control history” (or more precisely, the narrative) and steer it in the direction he desires, he needs to linguistically create the idea that history is something that has very distinct parts with beginnings and ends, and that these revolve around Russia.
The first “end of history” is when in 1654 Ukraine chose to intertwine its fate with Russia (Pereiaslav Agreement, when the Cossacks pledged allegiance to the Russian tsar).
The second “end of history” is when Khrushchev decides to “gift” Crimea to Ukraine – implying it’s Russia’s to give. We could also call it the “End of Crimean History”.
The third “end of history” is when Russia was operating under the communist regime with Brezhnev at the helm (1964). Brezhnev’s idea of communism was attained; thus, there is nothing better, no further development needed.
And where does Ukraine fit in? Or, more accurately for Putin, where does it not fit in?
The narrative of the Great Rus’ implies that Ukraine is not a real place. It should not exist by natural law; and it should be a part of Russia, or the Great Rus’, as Russia has an inalienable right to the territory of Ukraine. Only once Ukraine passes under the rule of Moscow can it become a “real place” – which will mean its people are liberated (“end of history”). This is all deftly veiled with the use of language suggesting camaraderie and togetherness, referring to, once again, the “ideal state” of affairs, as Putin writes:
“First of all, I would like to emphasize that the wall that has emerged in recent years between Russia and Ukraine, between the parts of what is essentially the same historical and spiritual space, to my mind is our great common misfortune and tragedy. These are, first and foremost, the consequences of our own mistakes made at different periods of time. But these are also the result of deliberate efforts by those forces that have always sought to undermine our unity.” (On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians)
Putin refers to the development of history as we know it as a “misfortune” and the result of “mistakes” (disruption). Apparently, he sees his role, and the role of Russia, as the entity which is entitled to, and endowed with, the ability to remedy the “mistakes” and “misfortunes” and bring about the ideal state – Russia and Ukraine being one and the same (redemption – end of history). The last part about the “forces” fuels the good-against-evil (us against them) dynamic so central to any myth.
The “us against them” narrative in this case is also the part of the myth that helps Russia stay relevant on the global political stage, and also helps Putin keep the country from falling apart. We could say that in Putin’s view, the narrative almost justifies the existence of the Russian nation and encapsulates its essence and identity. Tim Marshall in “Prisoners of Geography” gave Russia an important attribute – Russia is “vast”. With its immense territory spanning 11 time zones and numerous groups of peoples living within this territory, it would be a Sisyphean task for anyone to run such a vast, heterogeneous land smoothly without divisions or internal discord.
But if you can rally the peoples around a common myth (Ukraine is not a real place because, for example, people there speak two or more languages and, thus, don’t really know who they are; they don’t have an identity; and also the myth around Putin’s fabricated ends of history), disseminated and perpetuated in the form of language, and thereby create a common enemy (the West), it’s a lot easier to keep a grip on things.
Without a constructed common enemy and common belief in myth, it might just all fall apart.
Russia has made an enemy from Ukraine through language, by describing Ukrainians by every word that could be categorised, to some extent and in some contexts, as “other”: Nazis, gays, Jews, Islamists and even Satanists. Putin has used language to fuel the myth that Ukraine is not real; that Ukrainians are not a people.
That’s why it’s problematic for Putin to let Ukraine join NATO or the European Union – such action would suggest that Ukraine is a sovereign state and, at that, a “real place”. Which is categorically in contradiction with his constructed myth, narrative and the fundamental idea that Ukraine can only exist as part of Russia.
And Ukraine joining the European Union might bring about yet another “end of history”.
The notion of Ukraine’s existence solely as part of Russia is ironic, given the fact that the origins of the Russian civilisation can be traced back to Ukraine and Kyiv, as both Marshall and Plokhy point out:
“Russia as a concept dates back to the ninth century and a loose federation of East Slavic tribes known as Kievan Rus, which was based in Kiev and other towns along the Dnieper river, in what is now Ukraine.” (Prisoners of Geography, p. 7)
“The view of Ukrainians as constituents of the Russian nation goes back to the founding myth of modern Russia as a nation conceived and born in Kyiv, the ‘mother of Russian [rather than Rus’] cities.’ The Synopsis of 1674, the first printed ‘textbook’ of Russian history, compiled by Kyivan monks seeking the protection of the Muscovite tsars, first formulated and widely disseminated this myth in Russia.” (The Gates of Europe, p. 350)
It's almost a prophetic notion – once again, leading us to the importance of language, narrative, legend and the influence it is able to exert. The narrative of Kyiv being the centre of Russian civilisation simply does not fit Putin’s or Russia’s purposes, and the response is to create a new narrative, a new myth, which denies the very existence of Ukraine – and creates the sense of history ending on multiple occasions.
Putin’s idea seems to be adamant: Ukraine was a misstep in the evolution of history; it doesn’t really exist, and it is merely a diversion from the “ideal” state of things which must be reinstated. Equally central to his myth is that “Russia is always right, others are always wrong.” – again, perfectly delineating the structure of a myth, with clearly defined good and evil.
Making this myth a reality can now be a difficult task to achieve, as Ukraine has demonstrated its existence by mounting a resistance to the Russian invasion.
After all, it’s a simple narrative. Linguistic construct. Beginnings and endings. Words. But with very real consequences.
The last part on Reality, Myth and Language coming next month.