I like that you are taking up this topic, because so many others seem to ignore it.
The maltreatment of history, establishing a myth, legend, narrative, that justifies what would otherwise be considered unjustifiable, is happening in this particular case with Russia and Ukraine, but it is also the basis for most other events in politics. Especially these years, where nationalism and xenophobia are gaining terrain.
Sometimes we have to be careful, though, if we consider a narrative to be "created" and even for a purpose, to be used for propaganda, or if the one telling it perhaps does believe in it and just tries to tell it with words of his own.
History writing and telling has always been the victim of the poor distinction between evidence and conviction, and when trying to achieve something of historical significance, which is probably what Putin is doing, his own understanding of the past, present, and wanted future, will probably be colored by the situation he is in.
It may not, due to that, be a simple matter of revealing his lie, as he may not see it as such.
Of course, it is always possible that he is simply furious over being called a dickhead by the president of Ukraine, even if that happened in a comedy show, and before he was a president.
Thank you for taking the time to read it Jorgen. As always, you are spot on. I think that "narratives" are always, to a certain degree, created. But I get your point – Putin actually is convinced that this is reality.
Also, when you pointed out the situation Putin is in, and how that influences his thinking – I agree hundred per cent. I just didn't see enough space for me to get into it in this series. But Noam Chomsky analysed the situation quite well – pointing out the role of NATO and its expansion over the past years (decades), as well as the pressures coming from the EU, which would influence Russia's and Putin's international politics and policies.
As to the "narratives", Putin probably doesn't see it as a lie (no one knows what he thinks; certainly not me – I can only guess based on historical evidence and current developments). Thus, this whole series is only an attempt at wrapping my head around what's happening through the lens I can understand best: language.
I've also used only a pretty narrow scope of sources: Serhii Plokhy's book, Timothy Snyder's lectures, Putin's paper and Tim Marshall's Prisoners of Geography. My goal was to focus more on history than on the present developments, as the past seemed to be clearer, and this approach seemed to make more sense to me.
The goal is, however, to point out that the way we use language and treat history matters – exactly as you pointed out: that history writing and telling has always been the victim of poor distinction between evidence and conviction.
I like that you are taking up this topic, because so many others seem to ignore it.
The maltreatment of history, establishing a myth, legend, narrative, that justifies what would otherwise be considered unjustifiable, is happening in this particular case with Russia and Ukraine, but it is also the basis for most other events in politics. Especially these years, where nationalism and xenophobia are gaining terrain.
Sometimes we have to be careful, though, if we consider a narrative to be "created" and even for a purpose, to be used for propaganda, or if the one telling it perhaps does believe in it and just tries to tell it with words of his own.
History writing and telling has always been the victim of the poor distinction between evidence and conviction, and when trying to achieve something of historical significance, which is probably what Putin is doing, his own understanding of the past, present, and wanted future, will probably be colored by the situation he is in.
It may not, due to that, be a simple matter of revealing his lie, as he may not see it as such.
Of course, it is always possible that he is simply furious over being called a dickhead by the president of Ukraine, even if that happened in a comedy show, and before he was a president.
Some people can't really take criticism.
Thank you for taking the time to read it Jorgen. As always, you are spot on. I think that "narratives" are always, to a certain degree, created. But I get your point – Putin actually is convinced that this is reality.
Also, when you pointed out the situation Putin is in, and how that influences his thinking – I agree hundred per cent. I just didn't see enough space for me to get into it in this series. But Noam Chomsky analysed the situation quite well – pointing out the role of NATO and its expansion over the past years (decades), as well as the pressures coming from the EU, which would influence Russia's and Putin's international politics and policies.
As to the "narratives", Putin probably doesn't see it as a lie (no one knows what he thinks; certainly not me – I can only guess based on historical evidence and current developments). Thus, this whole series is only an attempt at wrapping my head around what's happening through the lens I can understand best: language.
I've also used only a pretty narrow scope of sources: Serhii Plokhy's book, Timothy Snyder's lectures, Putin's paper and Tim Marshall's Prisoners of Geography. My goal was to focus more on history than on the present developments, as the past seemed to be clearer, and this approach seemed to make more sense to me.
The goal is, however, to point out that the way we use language and treat history matters – exactly as you pointed out: that history writing and telling has always been the victim of poor distinction between evidence and conviction.